Na cumannaigh ar son Trump

Panu Höglund

Ceann de na rudaí is mó a tháinig aniar aduaidh le linn mhíonna na toghchánaíochta sna Stáit Aontaithe ná an dóigh ar thug Cumannaigh agus radacaigh áirithe eile ón eite chlé in áiteanna tacaíocht do Donald Trump thar Hillary Clinton. Shílfeá go mbeadh a leithéidí go tréan in aghaidh Trump, ach ní mar a shíltear a bhítear. Ba é Slavoj Žižek, an t-íolbhristeoir Slóivéanach, ba luaithe a théigh le Trump, ach tá an Domhan Thiar breac le mionintleachtóirí a thugas aird ar a chuid focal mar a bheadh briathar Dé iontu.

Is féidir cuid den iompú aisteach seo a mhíniú leis an draíocht a chuireas an Rúis ar intleachtóirí áirithe ón eite chlé. Tháinig sé chun solais de réir a chéile gurbh é Trump an t-iarrthóir ab ansa le Putin, agus ansin thosaigh na daoine seo ag áitiú orthu féin gurbh eisean rogha an dá dhíogha. Tá an dearcadh seo bunaithe ar an tuiscint gurb é ‘impiriúlachas an Iarthair’ a chuir an caidreamh idir an Rúis agus an tIarthar ó mhaith, agus mar sin creideann an dream seo go rachaidh an caidreamh sin i bhfeabhas arís má vótálann muintir Mheiriceá isteach Uachtarán atá géilliúil don Rúis.

Cúis ghaolmhar le tacaíocht a fhógairt do Trump ná chomh míshásta is atá a lán de lucht na heite clé leis an domhan aonpholach ina bhfuil na Stáit Aontaithe ar an t-aon mhórchumhacht amháin. I ndiaidh don Aontas Shóivéadach dul de dhroim an tsaoil ba iad na Stáit Aontaithe a chuaigh i gceannas ar an Domhan, a áitíos siad, agus ba é ba thoradh dó seo ná go bhfuair gnó-liobrálachas Mheiriceá an lámh in uachtar ar fud na cruinne, rud a raibh na gluaiseachtaí eite clé thíos leis, chomh maith leis an gcosmhuintir. Ní féidir a rá nach mbeadh ruainne éigin den cheart acu, ach is deacair a thuiscint cén fáth a dtaobhódh an Rúis leis an eite chlé inniu. Níl dáimh ná luiteamas ceart idé-eolaíoch ag an Rúis le haon chineál sóisialachais a thuilleadh; nó dealraíonn sé gurb é an tImpiriúlachas Rúiseach an t-aon smaointeoireacht atá ag spreagadh pholasaithe Phutin.

Mar a deir Putin féin is éard a theastaíos uaidh a shocrú le Trump ná conradh nua in aithris ar Chonradh Ribbentrop agus Mholotov. Ba é an conradh sin a d’fhág an Eastóin, an Laitvia agus an Liotuáin faoi chumhacht Stailín, chomh maith le hOirthear na Polainne. Thairis sin nuair a bhí an conradh sínithe bhí cead ag Stailín ón nGearmáin an Fhionlainn a shealbhú. Ba é ba thoradh dó seo ná gur ionsaigh na trúpaí Sóivéadacha an Fhionlainn, cogadh a dtugtar Cogadh an Gheimhridh air inniu.

Mar sin tá eagla orainn agus ar mhuintir thíortha eile Oirthear na hEorpa go ndíolfaidh Trump ar saorchonradh leis an Rúis sinn. Ar an drochuair tá an chuma ar an scéal go mbeadh cuid áirithe d’eite chlé an Iarthair breá sásta a leithéid sin a ghéilleadh do Phutin. 

Is gnách leis an eite chlé a shíleadh gurb iad na Stáit Aontaithe bunrúta gach olc ar an domhan. Na tíortha in Oirthear na hEorpa áfach, taispeánann a stair nach bhfuil an scéal chomh simplí sin. Ach is féidir faltanas áirithe a aithint ag cuid de radacaigh na heite clé i dtaobh ár gcearna den domhan, agus is dócha go mbainfidís sult mailíseach as dá n-osclófaí geataí ár gcuid tíortha do Phutin.

Scríbhneoirí Gaeilge ón bhFionlainn é Panu Höglund.


Communists for Trump

Panu Höglund

One of the biggest surprises during the election campaign in the United States has been how some communists and leftist radicals had given support to Donald Trump rather than Hillary Clinton. You’d think their ilk would be unanimously against him, but that’s not the way world works. The Slovenian iconoclast Slavoj Žižek showed the way, but the western world is full of little intellectuals who take his word as God’s word.

Much of this strange turn can be explained by the enthralment of some leftist intellectuals with Russia. It has gradually transpired that Trump is the favourite of Vladimir Putin, which has made these people convince themselves that he is the better of two bad choices. This view is based on the understanding that the relations of the west with Russia have gone bad due to ‘western imperialism’, and thus these people believe that those relations will improve as soon as Americans vote in a president who is submissive to Russia.

A related reason to show support to Trump is how dissatisfied many leftists are with the unipolar world, where the United States are the only superpower. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the USA came to dominate the world, they say, and this led to the supremacy of American business liberalism everywhere, to the detriment of left-wing movements as well as the common people. There might be some truth in this, but it is difficult to see why Russia would side with leftists today. Russia has no sympathy or ideological allegiance with any kind of socialism; rather it seems that Russian imperialism is the only philosophy behind Putin’s policies.

According to his own words, Putin wants to sign a new Ribbentrop-Molotov pact with Trump. That is the very pact that left Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under Stalin’s sway, as well as eastern Poland. Moreover, when the pact had been signed, Stalin had a free hand to have his way with Finland. This led to Soviet troops invading Finland, a war now known as the Winter War. 
So we, and the other Eastern European peoples, are afraid that Trump will sell us che
aply to Russia. Unfortunately, it seems that certain leftists in the west would be only too happy to concede that to Putin.
 
Leftists tend to think that the United States are the root cause of everything bad in the world. The history of Eastern Europe shows that this is not the truth after all. But some leftist radicals are kind of bitter towards our part of the world, and they would probably derive some malicious amusement from seeing our countries giving in to Putin.

Panu Höglund is a Finn who writes in Irish.

ENDS


^^^


The World At Home

Charles Laffiteau's Bigger Picture

Before I delve into the results of the US presidential election, I want to discuss the factors that led me to predict Hillary Clinton would clinch victory from her opponent Donald Trump. I based this primarily on three factors. First and foremost was my abiding faith in the American voters’ basic intelligence and optimism about their future. Second was my belief that Bernie Sanders’ millennial voters and the Hispanic and African-American voters who had turned out to vote for President Obama in 2012 would also turn out to either vote for Clinton or vote against Trump. Finally, I believed Clinton would also triumph in the traditionally Democratic states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, on top of the reliables in the north-east and others such as Illinois, New Mexico and California.

Unfortunately, I was wrong on all three counts. I erroneously thought a majority of American voters would not be as gullible and naïve as their counterparts in Britain had been in June’s Brexit election. I also wrongly believed Sanders’ enthusiastic young supporters would hold their noses and turn out for Clinton once they had seriously thought about the alternative of Donald Trump as their president. Finally, I underestimated the size of the ‘closet white vote’ of older, less educated voters who agreed with and secretly supported Trump.

When I look back at what happened over the course of the presidential primaries, it was apparent that a majority of Americans were unhappy with the political establishment of both parties. Since the anti-establishment fervour was strongest in the Republican Party, Trump used his status as an outsider to conquer a field of more experienced politicians. On the Democratic side, Bernie Sanders also captured the imagination of disillusioned millennial voters and rode a similar anti-establishment wave to victory in almost half of the Democratic Party’s primaries. So I was already well aware that this was a ‘change’ election, which in most case favours whichever candidate is perceived as the one most likely to challenge the political status quo.

However, when the ‘change candidate’ of this presidential election turned out to be a decidedly chauvinistic reality TV star, I assumed that a majority of American voters would think twice and carefully consider the consequences of the kind of change Donald Trump represented. This belief proved to be nothing more than wishful thinking on my part.

The truth is, I ignored the evidence that many of Sanders’ millennial supporters were not going to vote for Clinton. I also chose to minimise the significance of the ‘closet white voters’ too embarrassed to admit to pollsters that they were voting for Trump. I knew it was out there and that the pollsters were not picking up on it, but I simply did not want to believe that this contingent was large enough to tilt the election in Trump’s favour.

So even though Clinton won the national popular vote by a slim margin – 48 per cent to Trump’s 47 per cent – it was likely her opponent’s closet voters who put him over the top in normally Democratic states with large percentages of less educated white voters. As a result, Trump took Wisconsin (89% white), Pennsylvania (86% white) and Michigan (82% white) away from Clinton, while also sweeping the 58 electoral college votes of the traditional battleground states of Iowa (95% white), Ohio (86%), Florida (75%) and North Carolina (71%).

Nationally, the percentage of voters who are white continued to decline from 72 per cent in 2012 to 70 per cent in 2016, so in order to win this election it was essential for Trump to secure the white vote by a larger margin than Romney’s 20-point edge over President Obama in 2012. And Trump did exactly that, by winning 58 per cent of the non-Hispanic white vote nationally compared to only 37 per cent for Hillary Clinton. 

But Trump’s victory was due to a number of other factors beyond just his success winning over less-educated white voters. While there was a jump in turnout among Hispanic voters in traditionally Republican states like Texas and Arizona, Clinton only won 65 per cent of the Hispanic vote nationally, compared to the 71 per cent who voted for President Obama in 2012. 

Furthermore, even though Clinton defeated Sanders in the primaries thanks to the support of African-American voters, she only won the votes of 88 per cent of them, compared to the 93 per cent who voted for Obama. Clinton also garnered less support from younger voters, a drop of five percentage points.

While Clinton can also be faulted for not bothering to campaign in Wisconsin, I believe Trump’s win was primarily due to his success feeding the unrealistic expectations of older, less-educated white voters. I will discuss those expectations in more detail next time.

Charles Laffiteau is a US Republican from Dallas, Texas pursuing a career in public service. He previously lectured on Contemporary US Business & Society at DCU from 2Cli009-2011 and pursued a PhD in Public Policy and Political Economy.